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A Step Forward or Just a Sidestep?
Year Five of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Digital Age
Nader R. Hasan

I. INTRODUCTION
It is a cliché to write that computers and cell phones are ubiquitous.1
These devices and the digital technologies that make them work have
been a part of our lives for so long now that taking note of this fact seems
as quaint as extolling the wonders of airplanes or pasteurization. These
technologies are not new.
The laws responding to digital technologies, however, are new —
particularly as they relate to our privacy rights and the protections
afforded under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.2 Over the past five years, the Supreme Court of Canada has
issued a series of decisions meant to bring section 8 of the Charter into
the Digital Age. These decisions acknowledged the unique privacy
interests that people have in the information stored on their digital
devices. In R. v. Morelli, the Court held that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a
search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive of one’s privacy than the


Counsel, STOCKWOODS LLP (NaderH@stockwoods.ca). The author is grateful to
Frederick Schumann, Annamaria Enanajor, Penelope Ng and the anonymous reviewers for their
comments on an earlier draft of this article. The author also thanks Gerald Chan, who was
co-counsel with him in their representation of the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association in
R. v. Vu and R. v. Fearon, two of the cases discussed at length in this article.
1
In this article, I refer to “computers”, “cell phones” and “digital devices”, but the
distinction between these items is increasingly meaningless. See R. v. Fearon, [2014] S.C.J. No. 77,
[2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, at para. 51 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fearon”]; see also R. v. Vu, [2013] S.C.J.
No. 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, at para. 38 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vu (S.C.C.)”] (“Although historically
cellular telephones were far more restricted than computers in terms of the amount and kind of
information that they could store, present day phones have capacities that are, for our purposes,
equivalent to those of computers.”).
2
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”], s. 8.
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search and seizure of a personal computer.”3 In R. v. Cole, it held that
because of the “highly revealing” and “meaningful information” about an
individual’s personal life that is stored on a computer, we enjoy a
reasonable expectation of privacy even on work-issued computers that do
not belong to us.4 In R. v. TELUS Communications Co., a plurality of the
Court declared that “[t]echnical differences inherent in new technology
should not determine the scope of protection afforded to private
communications”, and held that the Criminal Code’s wiretap authorization
provisions apply to the prospective interception of text messages.5 In Vu,
the Court held that a search warrant may only be relied on to search the
contents of a computer where the warrant specifically authorizes a
computer search; a warrant that only authorizes the search of a residence
in which a computer happens to be found is inadequate.6 In R. v. Spencer,
the Court held that section 8 protects a right to online anonymity.7 And
most recently, in Fearon, the Court established a framework for
regulating warrantless searches of cell phones under the search-incidentto-arrest exception.8
In each of these decisions, the Court acknowledged that digital
technologies have fundamentally changed the game, and that the
prophylactic rules that protect our privacy rights from the State must
evolve to keep pace. Through these judgments, the Court demonstrated
an awareness of how these technologies work. It has also taken note of
their potential to eviscerate privacy if law enforcement is simply
permitted to apply the old Analog World rules in a Digital Age.
While the Court has recognized the unprecedented challenge to
privacy posed by the search and seizure of digital devices, it has stopped
short of creating bright-line rules to protect our privacy rights. In Vu,
despite the urging of civil liberties groups, the Court declined to impose a
constitutional requirement that computer search warrants include “search
protocols” to limit the invasiveness of a computer search. This leaves

3

R. v. Morelli, [2010] S.C.J. No. 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at para. 2 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Morelli”].
4

R. v. Cole, [2012] S.C.J. No. 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, at paras. 39-58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Cole”].
5
R. v. TELUS Communications Co., [2013] S.C.J. No. 16, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 5,
43-45 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TELUS”].
6
Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at paras. 3, 22.
7
R. v. Spencer, [2014] S.C.J. No. 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, at para. 47 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Spencer”].
8
Fearon, supra, note 1, at paras. 82-83.
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open the possibility that, once police are armed with a computer warrant,
they can conduct a dragnet search into our entire digital lives —
consisting potentially of millions of photographs, videos, e-mails, diaries
and private medical and banking documents. And in Fearon — despite
acknowledging that a cell phone is a miniature computer containing a
treasure trove of personal information about an individual — a majority
of the Court held that the police had a limited right to conduct
warrantless searches of a cell phone as a search incident to arrest.
The cynical way to read Vu and Fearon is that privacy matters but
only to the extent that it does not fetter law enforcement, which is to say,
it does not matter at all. Constitutional rights are meaningful only if they
limit State power. If these six decisions on digital search and seizure have
not succeeded in requiring more of law enforcement where our core privacy
rights are at stake, they have not succeeded in protecting privacy at all.
The less cynical way to read these cases is that the law of digital search
and seizure remains a work in progress. The task for lawyers and the trial
courts will be to reconcile the Supreme Court’s pro-privacy language with
the actual holdings in Vu and Fearon. That task is the goal of this article.
I suggest that the apparent tension between the Court’s pro-privacy
language and the holdings in Vu and Fearon can be reconciled by insisting
on rigorous ex post review of police searches of computers and cell phones.
While the Supreme Court in Vu did not impose a requirement of “search
protocols” as a constitutional imperative in all cases, I suggest that in many
cases the only way to achieve the appropriate balance between law
enforcement needs and privacy rights is for issuing justices to impose a set
of search protocols that constrain and limit the scope of the computer
search. In the context of searches of cell phones incident to arrest, I suggest
that the only way to achieve meaningful after-the-fact review is to require
that police electronically record all warrantless cell phone searches.
Part 1 of this article will summarize the key lessons from the
Supreme Court of Canada’s six digital-search-and-seizure decisions from
2010 to 2014. Part 2 will focus on two of the most recent of those
decisions, Vu and Fearon, and explain the apparent tension that exists
between the pro-privacy language in Morelli, Cole, TELUS, Vu and
Spencer and the actual holdings in Vu and Fearon. Part 3 will suggest
that the only way to reconcile this tension is to insist on rigorous mannerof-search review, including a requirement of search protocols in the case
of warranted searches, and a requirement that police video-record all
warrantless cell phone searches.
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1. Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence on Digital
Search and Seizure
(a) Morelli (2010) and Cole (2011)
Morelli marked a technological awakening of the Supreme Court of
Canada. The Court, for the first time, turned its mind to the highly intrusive
nature of a search of one’s personal computer. In Morelli, a computer
technician had arrived at the accused’s house to install a high-speed Internet
connection. He noticed, among other things, Internet links to adult and child
pornography in the browser taskbar’s favourites list. The technician
contacted a social worker, who informed the RCMP, which subsequently
obtained a warrant to search the accused’s computer. The ensuing search
revealed evidence of child pornography. The Supreme Court held that the
search violated section 8 of the Charter. The warrant should not have issued
because statements contained in the ITO were misleading and erroneous.
The important part of the judgment for the purposes of this article,
however, is the Court’s analysis under section 24(2) of the Charter. The
Court excluded the improperly obtained evidence under section 24(2)
because of the highly invasive nature of a search of one’s personal
computer. Justice Fish wrote:
It is difficult to imagine a search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive
of one’s privacy than the search and seizure of a personal computer.
First, police officers enter your home, take possession of your computer,
and carry it off for examination in a place unknown and inaccessible to
you. There, without supervision or constraint, they scour the entire
contents of your hard drive: your emails sent and received; accompanying
attachments; your personal notes and correspondence; your meetings and
appointments; your medical and financial records; and all other saved
documents that you have downloaded, copied, scanned, or created. The
police scrutinize as well the electronic roadmap of your cybernetic
peregrinations, where you have been and what you appear to have seen on
the Internet — generally by design, but sometimes by accident.
.....
Computers often contain our most intimate correspondence. They
contain the details of our financial, medical, and personal situations.
They even reveal our specific interests, likes, and propensities,
recording in the browsing history and cache files the information we
seek out and read, watch, or listen to on the Internet.
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It is therefore difficult to conceive a s. 8 breach with a greater impact
on the Charter-protected privacy interests of the accused than occurred
in this case.9

The logic of Morelli drove the analysis in the Supreme Court’s
subsequent computer-privacy decisions. In Cole, the accused, a high
school teacher, was permitted to use his work-issued and school boardowned laptop for incidental personal purposes. He browsed the Internet
and stored personal information on his hard-drive. When a school
technician found a hidden folder containing nude photographs of a
female student on the accused’s computer, he notified the principal. The
principal copied the photographs onto a CD and seized the laptop, both
of which were handed over to the police, who, without a warrant,
reviewed their contents and created a mirror image of the hard drive for
forensic purposes. The accused did not own the computer hardware but
he did own the personal and private information stored on it — private
information that “falls at the very heart of the ‘biographical core’
protected by s. 8 of the Charter”.10 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held
that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his workissued computer, and that the warrantless search of the computer had
violated section 8.
(b) TELUS (2013)
The Court was confronted with a different technology-based
challenge in TELUS, but like Morelli and Cole, the new realities created
by digital technologies drove the Court’s analysis. The police in TELUS
obtained a general warrant and related assistance order under
sections 487.01 and 487.02 of the Criminal Code,11 requiring Telus to
provide the police with copies of any stored text messages sent or
received by two Telus subscribers. Telus applied to quash the general
warrant arguing that the prospective, daily acquisition of text messages
from their computer database constituted an interception of private
communications and therefore required authorization under the wiretap
authorization provisions in Part VI of the Criminal Code.

9
10
11

Morelli, supra, note 3, at paras. 2-3, 105-106.
Cole, supra, note 4, at para. 48.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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Part VI of the Criminal Code is Parliament’s response to the dangers
of allowing the State unfettered discretion to listen to and record our
private telephone conversations. The need to prevent unnecessary state
intrusions into our private lives is essential not just for privacy, but also
for expressive freedom. As Harlan J. famously noted, “Were third-party
bugging a prevalent practice, it might well smother that spontaneity —
reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant discourse —
that liberates daily life.”12
These dangers moved Parliament in 1974 to enact what is now Part VI
of the Criminal Code. The purpose of Part VI is to provide a “higher
degree of protection … for private communications”.13 Its requirements
are stricter than those of the other warrant provisions in the Criminal
Code to reflect the heightened privacy interests at stake.14 For example,
unlike any other warrant provisions in the Criminal Code, a Part VI
authorization can only be obtained where the judge is satisfied under
section 186(1)(b) “that other investigative procedures have been tried
and have failed, other investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed or
the urgency of the matter is such that it would be impractical to carry out
the investigation of the offence using only other investigative
procedures” (i.e., investigative necessity).15
The issue in TELUS was whether Part VI — traditionally concerned
with interception of telephonic voice communications — applied to the
prospective acquisition of cell phone text messages. Taking a purposive
approach, the plurality held that Part VI applied to the prospective
acquisition of text messages. “Text messaging”, wrote Abella J., “is, in
essence, an electronic conversation. The only practical difference
between text messaging and the traditional voice communications is the
transmission process”.16
The plurality’s purposive approach was supported by the broad
definition of “intercept” in the Criminal Code, which was not limited to
traditional wiretapping (involving “bugging” a telephone line and

12
United States v. White, 91 S. Ct. 1122, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), at 787-89 [hereinafter
“White”], as quoted in R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 54 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Duarte”].
13
TELUS, supra, note 5, at para. 31, per Abella J.
14
Id., at para. 27, per Abella J.
15
Criminal Code, supra, note 11, s. 186(1)(b). It should be noted that under s. 186(1.1)
there are exceptions to the “investigative necessity” requirement where the wiretap relates to
criminal organizations or terrorism offences.
16
TELUS, supra, note 5, at para. 5.
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listening to the conversation), but was defined to include, “listen to,
record or acquire a communication or acquire the substance, meaning or
purport thereof”17 — terms that could apply equally to the acquisition of
text messages. Accordingly, the plurality concluded, Part VI should apply
to the prospective acquisition of text messages.18 “Technical differences
inherent in new technology should not determine the scope of protection
afforded to private communications.”19
(c) R. v. Vu (2013)
The Court in Vu picked up where it left off in Morelli and Cole. The
accused was charged with several drug-related offences, including theft
of electricity. The police obtained a warrant authorizing the search of a
residence for evidence of theft of electricity, including documentation
identifying the owners and/or occupants of the residence. The
Information to Obtain a Search Warrant (“ITO”) indicated that the police
intended to search for, among other things, “computer generated notes”,
but the warrant did not specifically authorize the search of computers. In
the course of their search of the residence, police discovered two
computers and a cellular telephone, which they searched without
obtaining a new warrant. These searches led to evidence that Vu was the
occupant of the residence.20
At trial, the accused claimed that these searches violated his rights
under section 8 of the Charter because the search warrant did not
specifically authorize the police to search the computers or the cellular
phone. The trial judge accepted this argument and excluded most of the
evidence found as a result of these searches and acquitted the accused of
the drug charges.21

17

Criminal Code, supra, note 11, s. 183.
While the issue in TELUS concerned the applicability of Part VI to prospective
interception of text messages (i.e., ex ante authorization to intercept a future message), the reasoning
in TELUS also supports an argument that Part VI should apply to the retroactive interception of text
messages and e-mails (i.e., any search of private electronic communications) on a cell phone or
computer. See Factum of the BCCLA, Fearon v. Her Majesty the Queen, SCC Case No. 35298, online:
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35298/FM060_Intervener_BritishColumbia- Civil-Liberties-Association.pdf>. That discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
19
TELUS, supra, note 5, at para. 5.
20
Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 4.
21
R. v. Vu, [2010] B.C.J. No. 1777, 218 C.R.R. (2d) 98, at paras. 60-69 (B.C.S.C.).
18
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The British Columbia Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and
ordered a new trial. It held that a computer was no different than “a fourdrawer filing cabinet” when it came to search and seizure law.22 The
general rule when it came to physical objects, according to the Court of
Appeal, is that a warrant authorizing a search of a specific location for
specific things confers on those executing that warrant the authority to
conduct a reasonable examination of anything at that location within
which the specified things might be found. “Just as it cannot be said that
a warrant to search for documentary evidence relating to a fraudulent
scheme would not apply to a four-drawer filing cabinet …”, the B.C.
Court of Appeal wrote, “neither can it be said that such a warrant would
not apply to a computer, the existence of which the police learn of after
entering a residence”.23
The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed. Its decision in Vu lays to
rest the quaint notion that computers are no different from physicalworld receptacles like filing cabinets, drawers and briefcases. It held
that the police violated Vu’s rights against unreasonable search and
seizure under section 8 of the Charter when they searched the three
electronic devices found on the premises. It rejected the B.C. Court of
Appeal’s holding that a computer is no different from a physical
container. “Computers differ in important ways from the receptacles
governed by the traditional framework,” wrote Cromwell J. for a
unanimous Court, “and computer searches give rise to particular
privacy concerns that are not sufficiently addressed by that approach”. 24
Specific, prior authorization to search a computer was necessary to
comply with section 8 of the Charter.
The outcome in Vu is not surprising. The writing had been on the
touch-screen since Morelli.25 Nevertheless, before Vu, the approach of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal had been accepted by learned trial
and appellate courts across the country, which routinely compared
computers to containers, briefcases,26 “sealed box[es]”,27 “logbook[s],

22
R. v. Vu, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2487, 250 C.R.R. (2d) 108, at para. 63 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter
“Vu (B.C.C.A.)”].
23
Id.
24
Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 2.
25
Morelli, supra, note 3, at paras. 2, 105 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a more intrusive
invasion of privacy than the search of one’s home and personal computer”.)
26
R. v. Polius, [2009] O.J. No. 3074, 196 C.R.R. (2d) 288, at para. 47 (Ont. S.C.J.)
(“[a] cell phone is the functional equivalent of a locked briefcase …”).
27
R. v. Burchell, [2011] O.J. No. 4723, 246 C.R.R. (2d) 74, at para. 55 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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diar[ies] or notebook[s]”,28 and “four-drawer filing cabinets”.29 Vu rejected
these analogies and held what was implied but not explicitly stated in
Morelli and Cole: that the old rules that protected privacy in an Analog
World are insufficient in the Digital Age. Modern computers, cell phones and
personal digital assistants are not analogous to the traditional “receptacles”
found in the course of search and seizure.30
What makes computers and computer technology so different? The
Court in Vu catalogued a number of important ways in which computers
are qualitatively different from physical world receptacles and explained
how these unique features affect digital privacy.
First, the quantity of the information stored on computers is unlike
anything in the physical world.31 For less than $100, anyone can
purchase a computer hard drive with storage capacity of 1 terabyte
(1,000 GB),32 which is roughly equivalent to 500 million pages of text —
or about the amount of information contained in all of the books on
12 floors of an academic library.33 Given this “massive storage capacity”,
the Supreme Court noted, there is a significant difference between the
search of a computer and the search of a briefcase or filing cabinet found
in the same location.34
Second, the type of information stored on a computer is often
intimate and private, thereby “fall[ing] at the very heart of the
‘biographical core’ protected by s. 8 of the Charter”.35 As the Court
previously noted, virtually every aspect of one’s private life is

28

R. v. Giles, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2918, 2007 BCSC 1147, at para. 56 (B.C.S.C.).
Vu (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 22, at para. 63.
30
Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 24 (“The privacy interests implicated by computer
searches are markedly different from those at stake in searches of receptacles such as cupboards and
filing cabinets.”).
31
Id. (“Computers potentially give police access to vast amounts of information that users
cannot control, that they may not even be aware of or may have chosen to discard and which may
not be, in any meaningful sense, located in the place of the search.”)
32
See Best Buy Canada, online: Bestbuy.ca <http://www.bestbuy.ca/Search/SearchResults.
aspx?path=ca77b9b4beca91fe414314b86bb581f8en20&query=h ard+drive+external> (last visited
October 26, 2015); “Hard Drives”, online: PC Mag.com <http://www.pcmag.com/reviews/harddrives> (last visited October 2, 2015).
33
Orin S. Kerr, “Searches and Seizures in a Digital World” (2006) 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531
[hereinafter “Kerr”], at 542; see also Marc Palumbo, “How Safe Is Your Data?: Conceptualizing
Hard Drives Under the Fourth Amendment” (2009) 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 977 [hereinafter
“Palumbo”], at 995.
34
Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 41.
35
Id., at para. 40; Cole, supra, note 4, at para. 48 (S.C.C.).
29
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consolidated into one’s computer, including “our most intimate
correspondence”, “details of our financial, medical, and personal
situations”, and “our specific interests, likes, and propensities” as
revealed through the records of what we “seek out and read, watch, or
listen to on the Internet”.36 People today use computers as photo albums,
stereos, telephones, desktops, filing cabinets, waste paper baskets,
televisions, postal services, playgrounds, jukeboxes, dating services,
movie theaters, shopping malls, personal secretaries, virtual diaries and
more.37 Your computer may reveal to the world more about you than
your spouse, family members or close friends ever could.
Third, the computer is a “fastidious record keeper”.38 Computers
contain information that is automatically generated, often unbeknownst
to the user. This computer-generated “meta-data” tracks information
about who created a document on what date or who visited a given
website at a particular time. It can reveal significant private information
about the user’s interests, habits and identity.39
Fourth, a computer retains files and data even after users think they
have destroyed them.40 When a user “deletes” a file, the operating system
simply marks the disk clusters occupied by that particular file as
available for future use by other files. If the operating system does not
reuse that cluster for another file by the time the computer is searched,
the file marked for deletion will be available for forensic examination.41
Even if another file has been assigned to that cluster, a large amount of
that data can be forensically recovered from the computer’s “slack
space”, i.e., space within the cluster left temporarily unused.42 In an era
where hard drive data storage now exceeds multiple terabytes, this means

36

Morelli, supra, note 3, at paras. 3, 105; Cole, supra, note 4, at para. 47.
Kerr, supra, note 33, at 569. See also Lesley Ciaruula Taylor, “The astonishing amount
of personal data police can extract from your smartphone” (February 27, 2013), The Star.com,
online: <www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/02/27/the_astonishing_amount_of_personal_ data_police_
can_extract_from_your_smartphone.print.html> (where a police search of a smart phone revealed
104 call logs, eight passwords, 422 text messages, six wireless networks, and 10,149 files of audio,
pictures, text and videos — 378 of which were deleted).
38
Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 42.
39
Id.
40
Id., at para. 43.
41
Edward T.M. Garland & Donald F. Samuel, “The Fourth Amendment and Computers:
Is a Computer Just Another Container or Are New Rules Required to Reflect New Technologies?”
(2009) 10 Ga. B.J. 14, at 16; Kerr, supra, note 33, at 542; R. v. Little, [2009] O.J. No. 3278, at para. 96
(Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Little”].
42
Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 43 (citing Kerr, supra, note 33, at 542).
37
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that many of us unwittingly retain massive amounts of data we attempted
to delete. Your computer’s “delete” key thus is more appropriately
described as the “hide” button — it hides files from the casual user but
preserves them for the future forensic examiner.
Finally, a computer is rarely a stand-alone, self-contained entity.
A computer that is connected to a network or to the Internet is a portal to
a world exponentially larger than the computer itself.43 A search of a
computer for which the police have lawful authority to access will
potentially give police access to other users’ information stored on other
devices and for which the police have no lawful authority to search.
These unique factors “call for distinctive treatment under s. 8 of the
Charter”.44 The old bricks-and-mortar approach to section 8 cannot be
applied haphazardly to computers. The “markedly different” privacy
interests flowing from computers call for a rule requiring specific, prior
authorization before the police can search a computer.45
(d) R. v. Spencer (2014)
Whereas Morelli, Cole, TELUS and Vu concerned privacy in data
stored on digital devices, Spencer concerned privacy in one’s virtual life.
In Spencer, an officer of the Saskatoon Police Service was engaged in a
child pornography investigation. Using the publicly available Limewire
file-sharing software, he searched for users sharing child pornography.
Limewire also permitted him to see the Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses
associated with each user. He ran a list of IP addresses against a database
with approximate locations and found that one of the IP addresses had an
approximate location of Saskatoon, with Shaw Communications Inc.
(“Shaw”) as the Internet Service Provider.46
What he lacked, however, was a precise knowledge of where exactly
the computer was and who was using it. He therefore made a request to
Shaw under section 7(3)(c.1) of the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act,47 requesting the subscriber information

43

Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 44.
Id., at para. 45.
45
Id., at paras. 46-49.
46
Spencer, supra, note 7, at paras. 7-12.
47
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5
[hereinafter “PIPEDA”].
44
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associated with the IP address. No warrant was obtained. Shaw complied
with the request and provided their customer’s name, address and
telephone number.
The question on appeal was whether section 8 demands that a
warrant be sought and obtained to access Internet subscriber information.
The Crown argued that section 8 protects informational privacy only
where the user has a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Morelli and
Cole, the data searched involved information going to the accused’s core
biographical information. In Spencer, however, the information sought —
the name, address and telephone number matching a publicly available IP
address — did “not touch on the core of Mr. Spencer’s biographical
information”.48 There is no privacy in a name and address.
The Supreme Court disagreed. What was being sought was not
simply generic biographical information; “it was the identity of an
Internet subscriber which corresponded to particular Internet usage”.49
Knowing both the IP address, and associated user activity, combined with
identifying information, would tell you a great deal about that
individual’s biographic core. Accordingly, the accused did have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the identifying information.50
The logic of the Court’s reasoning is compelling when we
understand privacy as anonymity. Privacy is often associated with the
right to control personal information about oneself. But to think of
privacy only as the “right to control information” obscures the equally
important right to anonymity.51
Anonymity permits individuals to act in the public sphere but to
preserve freedom from identification and surveillance.52 An analogy with
the physical world is helpful. We enjoy a degree of anonymity as we go
about our daily lives. We may go to the office, the gym, the bar, the
shopping mall, the medical clinic, the place of worship, or maybe even
the swingers’ club. These are all (to varying degrees) public places where
we are no doubt seen by others. But we might feel more inhibited going

48

Spencer, supra, note 7, at para. 25.
Id., at para. 32.
50
Id., at para. 45.
51
See id., at paras. 38-51; A.F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum,
1967) 7; Duarte, supra, note 12, at 46; R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417,
at 429 (S.C.C.); Andrea Slane & Lisa M. Austin, “What’s in a Name? Privacy and Citizenship in the
Voluntary Disclosure of Subscriber Information in Online Child Exploitation Investigations” (2011)
57 Crim. L.Q. 486 [hereinafter “Slane & Austin”].
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Spencer, supra, note 7, at para. 43 (citing Slane & Austin, id., at 31-32).
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to these places if there were a life-size nametag hanging over our heads
everywhere we went. That inhibition might in turn stymie the creativity
and spontaneity that are necessary for individuals to thrive in a free and
democratic society.53 “The mere fact that someone leaves the privacy of
their home and enters a public space does not mean that the person
abandons all of his or her privacy rights, despite the fact that as a
practical matter, such a person may not be able to control who observes
him or her in public.”54
The Court cited R. v. Wise, a physical world case involving privacy
as anonymity. The Court in Wise held that the ongoing monitoring of a
vehicle’s whereabouts on public highways using a tracking device
amounted to a violation of the suspect’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.55 It could have been argued that the suspect was driving his car
in public areas for all the world to see, and therefore, did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, but even the Crown conceded in Wise
that ongoing beeper monitoring violates the suspect’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.56
Browsing the Internet is the digital world equivalent of driving
around town. We drive from website to website — to shop, to visit our
virtual worlds, to do our banking and to satisfy our quirky curiosities —
in full view of each website we visit and our Internet service provider.
Through the use of “cookies” and other devices, Internet search engines
like Google and social networking sites like Facebook gather information
about our likes, interests and shopping habits. Only “by guarding the link
between the information and the identity of the person to whom it
relates” can the user be assured that Internet activity remains private.57

53
White, supra, note 12, at 787-89, as quoted in Duarte, supra, note 12, at 54; see also
R. v. Ward, [2012] O.J. No. 4587, 2012 ONCA 660, at para. 48 (Ont. C.A.).
54
Spencer, supra, note 7, at para. 44.
55
R. v. Wise, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, at 538 (S.C.C.).
56
Id. It should be noted that Wise was decided at a time when the police were limited to
fixing (now seemingly ancient “beepers” onto cars — technology that is now obsolete owing to GPS
tracking devices). In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the United States Supreme Court
reached a similar result as in Wise in the context of modern GPS tracking devices, and in Torrey
Dale Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 at 1370 (2015), it clarified that its holding in Jones
applies equally to tracking people as it does to vehicles.
57
Spencer, supra, note 7, at para. 46.
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(e) R. v. Fearon (2014)
The Court’s first five digital-search-and-seizure decisions arguably
expanded the ambit of our section 8 privacy rights and imposed new
requirements on police seeking to search our digital devices. Fearon took
an (unexpected) opposite turn. In a narrow 4-3 decision, the Supreme
Court in Fearon held that law enforcement has the power — albeit a
limited one — to conduct a warrantless search of a cell phone under the
common law search-incident-to-arrest power.
Fearon was arrested following an armed robbery of a jewellery
merchant at a Toronto flea market. Upon arrest, a pat-down search
revealed Fearon’s cell phone, which police accessed both at that moment
and again later at the station. Scrolling through Fearon’s photographs, the
police found an incriminating draft text message referring to jewellery
and opening with the words, “We did it…”. They also found a
photograph of a handgun. Police subsequently recovered the handgun
during a search of the getaway vehicle. The trial judge found that the
handgun used in the robbery was the same as the one in the photograph
and found in the getaway vehicle.58
At trial and on appeal, Fearon argued that both searches violated his
section 8 Charter rights and sought to have the inculpatory text message
and photograph excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter. In response,
the Crown argued that the searches were mere applications of the
common law police power to search a suspect incident to arrest, and
therefore reasonable under section 8 of the Charter.
A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable.59 But the common
law in Canada has long recognized the search-incident-to-arrest power as a
narrow exception to the presumptive rule.60 For more than two decades, the
search-incident-to-arrest exception has remained a limited exception
because it has been tightly tied to its purposes. First, the arrest itself must
be lawful. Second, the search must aim at a valid search-incident-to-arrest
purpose, such as (1) police safety; (2) safeguarding evidence; or (3)
discovering evidence.61
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Fearon, supra, note 1, at paras. 5-9.
R. v. Nolet, [2010] S.C.J. No. 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851, at para. 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Nolet”]; Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 161 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Hunter”].
60
See Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] S.C.J. No. 10, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158, at 181-82 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Caslake, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at para. 17 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Caslake”].
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Caslake, id., at para. 25.
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The question in Fearon was whether the warrantless search of a
suspect’s cell phone falls within this exception. Justice Cromwell,
writing for the majority, held that it should. He noted that cell phones,
like computers, are quantitatively and qualitatively different from
physical world storage devices — both because of their immense storage
capacity and the intimate, personal nature of the information stored on
them — but held that to exclude them from the search-incident-to-arrest
exception would upset the balance between privacy interests and law
enforcement’s needs. Justice Cromwell held that the appropriate balance
can be struck by permitting but circumscribing the search of cell phones
incident to arrest. This would be accomplished by ensuring that the
search is truly incidental to the arrest in that it promotes at least one of
the valid law enforcement purposes — i.e., protecting the police, the
accused or the public; preserving evidence; or discovering evidence,
“including locating additional suspects, in situations in which the
investigation will be stymied or significantly hampered absent the ability
to promptly search the cell phone incident to arrest”.62
To help ensure that searches incident to arrest of cell phones remained
tightly moored to these legitimate purposes, after-the-fact review is
especially important. Accordingly, Cromwell J. wrote, officers must make
“detailed notes” of what they have examined on the cell phone.63 A careful
record is essential to ensuring meaningful after-the-fact review.64
2. Digital Privacy: A Step Forward or Just a Sidestep?
(a) The Problem with Fearon
Until Fearon, it appeared that the Supreme Court was marching
along a teleological path to greater privacy protections in the Digital Age.
Fearon arguably undermines that inference. Whereas the Morelli/
Cole/TELUS/Vu/Spencer line of cases focused on bringing section 8
Charter rights into the Digital Age, Fearon appears to try to squeeze a
Digital Age problem back into an Analog World box.

62
63
64

Fearon, supra, note 1, at para. 83.
Id., at paras. 82-83.
Id., at para. 82.
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The search-incident-to-arrest rules were devised at a time when
people carried only their wallet, keys and maybe a pack of cigarettes65 on
their person. In 1998, when Caslake — the Supreme Court’s leading
search-incident-to-arrest case — was decided, it would have seemed
far-fetched to imagine people carrying around miniature computerphones containing copies of all of their private correspondence, their
scheduling calendars, as well as their Internet browsing history and
information stored on any number of mobile phone “apps”. As the
unanimous United States Supreme Court observed in its decision on
warrantless cell phone searches in Riley v. California, “[a] decade ago
police officers searching an arrestee might have occasionally stumbled
across a highly personal item such as a diary … Today, by contrast, it is
no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American
adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of
nearly every aspect of their lives — from the mundane to the intimate.”66
A search of a cell phone can reveal as much about its user as a search
of that person’s laptop or desktop computer — and then some. Canadians
increasingly engage in private text-based communications using their cell
phones. More than any other computing device, cell phones contain
massive amounts of private communications. In 2008, 44 per cent of
Canadians said that text messaging was the most common activity they
performed on their cell phone aside from voice calls; 11 per cent said
e-mailing; and 6 per cent said instant messaging. 67 Since 2008,
Canadians’ use of text messaging has more than quadrupled. In 2012, the
total text messages sent in Canada numbered 96.5 billion.68 As
MacKenzie J. observed in R. v. Giles, “the explosion of e-mail and other
text-based modes of instantaneous communication has meant that much
of our communication that was once exclusively verbal is now by
electronic text”.69 Nearly all of these communications can be retrieved
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See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), at 2490 (U.S. Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter “Riley”].
67
2008 Wireless Attitudes Study Conducted on behalf of the Canadian Wireless
Telecommunications Association, at 13, September 12, 2008, available online: <http://www.cwta.ca/
CWTASite/english/pdf/DecimaStudy_2008.pdf>.
68
Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association, “Mobile Originated Text Messages in
Canada Yearly (2002-2012)”, online: <http://www.cwta.ca/blog/2013/05/06/canadians-sent-96-5-billiontext-messages-in-2012/>.
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R. v. Giles, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2918, 2007 BCSC 1147, at para. 43 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter
“Giles”]; R. v. Belcourt, [2012] B.C.J. No. 2636, 296 C.C.C. (3d) 163, at para. 9 (B.C.S.C.).
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from a cell phone — including those that the user has deleted.70 Thus, the
police often search cell phones for the primary purpose of retrieving
private communications.71 That type of search — the acquisition of
private communications — has traditionally garnered a higher (not
lower) degree of protection in the form of protections under Part VI of
the Criminal Code.
In addition, cell phones — unlike our larger computing devices —
are invariably on our person at any given time. As the United States
Supreme Court noted in Riley, cell phones “are now such a pervasive and
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might
conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy”. 72 Cell
phones also keep invisible records of every cellular tower and every
WiFi network the user has ever logged into.73 Given that most of us carry
our cell phones everywhere, these records give law enforcement access
to what is essentially a retroactive tracking device, with which they can
retrace all of the user’s movements, beginning from when the user first
purchased the phone.74 Thus, the vast repository of highly personal data

70
Extraction Report in In the Matter of the Search of an Apple I-Phone model A1332
with IC#________, online: <https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/iphone-forensics-report_redacted.pdf>
[hereinafter “Extraction Report”]; American Civil Liberties Union, “New Document Sheds Light on
Government’s Ability to Search iPhones”, February 26, 2013, online: <https://www.aclu.org/
blog/technology-and-liberty-criminal-law-reform-immigrants-rights/new-document-sheds-light>.
See also R. v. Vye, [2014] B.C.J. No. 98, 301 C.R.R. (2d) 180, at para. 5 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter
“Vye”]; Giles, supra, note 69, at paras. 18-19; Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 43. The cell phone
in Giles could store 10,000 messages, and the storage capacity of cell phones has grown by more
than 4,000 times since Giles. See Apple – iPhone 6 – Technical Specifications, online:
<https://www.apple.com/ca/iphone-6/specs/>.
71
In Vye, supra, note, 70, at para. 5, the police retrieved 633 text messages from the
accused’s phone over a six-month period, including deleted messages; in R. v. Hiscoe, [2013] N.S.J.
No. 188, 328 N.S.R. (2d) 381, at paras. 5-8 (N.S.C.A.), the police reviewed a number of text
messages in the accused’s cell phone at the arrest scene before downloading the contents of the
entire phone to a DVD; in R. v. Liew, [2012] O.J. No. 1365, 2012 ONSC 1826, at para. 26
(Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Liew”], the police conducted a “fairly extensive search” of the text
messages in the accused’s cell phone at the police detachment; and in Giles, supra, note, 69, at para. 13,
the police retrieved 164 e-mail messages from the co-accused’s cell phone.
72
Riley, supra, note 66, at 2484.
73
Extraction Report, supra, note 70.
74
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, No. 12-12928 (slip opinion), at *76 (11 Cir. May 5,
2015), per Martin J., dissenting. In Davis, the government obtained 67 days of cell site location
data disclosing the suspect’s location every time he made or received a call. During that 67 -day
period, the suspect received 5,803 phone calls, so the prosecution had 11,606 data points about
his location.
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that the Court was concerned about protecting in Morelli and Vu is
arguably even more at risk in the Fearon search-incident-to-arrest
context than in the home computer context.
The majority’s ruling in Fearon also creates another curious tension
with Vu. If the police find your cell phone or computer in your home
pursuant to a valid warrant, they cannot search your device (unless the
warrant specifically allows it),75 but if they arrest you without a warrant
with those same devices, they have the right to search them.76
That distinction might have made more sense in a pre-Digital Age. In
earlier times, no search of a place was more invasive than the search of
one’s home.77 This is no longer true. As the United States Supreme Court
wrote in Riley:
In 1926, Learned Hand observed … that it is “a totally different thing
to search a man’s pockets and use against him what they contain, from
ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him.” If his
pockets contain a cell phone, however, that is no longer true. Indeed, a
cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more
than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains
in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it
also contains a broad array of private information never found in a
home in any form — unless the phone is.78

Given the privacy interests at stake in Fearon, one would think that
the law enforcement interests must be particularly strong to justify the
warrantless search. Curiously, however, they appear more attenuated than
even the ordinary search-incident-to-arrest context.
The Fearon majority identified three legitimate purposes of the
search incident to arrest of cell phones: (1) police and public safety; (2)
safeguarding the evidence; or (3) discovering evidence. It is difficult to
see how any of these goals would be undermined by a warrant
requirement.
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Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at paras. 46-49.
Fearon, supra, note 1, at paras. 82-83.
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Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 at 390 (1914) (discussing the “a man’s house is his
castle” doctrine); see also R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 22
(S.C.C.) (individuals are entitled to a high expectation of privacy in the home because it is “the place
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It is uncontroversial that the police have the lawful authority to seize
the phone, provided that they have a reasonable basis to believe that the
phone may contain evidence of the alleged offence.79 So there is no real
concern that the phone will be used as a physical weapon. If the concern,
on the other hand, is the risk that the suspect has summoned his
confederates via text or voice communication to come to his aid and
ambush the police, then, as Karakatsanis J. noted in dissent, the “exigent
circumstances” exception can ably deal with this Hollywood scenario
(provided that the police have reasonable grounds to believe that the
suspect has summoned his accomplices to his aid).80 Indeed, the exigent
circumstances exception is a well-established common-law exception
to the warrant requirement, which permits police to search or seize
property where there is a “risk of imminent loss or destruction of the
evidence or contraband” and “where there is a concern for public or
police safety”.81 Parliament codified the exigent circumstances exception
under section 487.11 of the Criminal Code, providing that police may
exercise powers of search and seizure “without a warrant if the
conditions for obtaining a warrant exist but by reason of exigent
circumstances it would be impracticable to obtain a warrant”.82
The other goals identified by the Fearon majority as justifying a
limited warrantless search — the preservation of evidence and discovery
of evidence — are both valid goals, but it is difficult to see how these
goals would be frustrated if the police were to seize the cell phone at the
scene but wait to search it until they had obtained a warrant.83 As the
dissenting judges observed, “[t]he text messages and photographs
79
For distinction between the right to seize and right to search, see Cole, supra, note 4, at
para. 65 (“The police may well have been authorized to take physical control of the laptop and CD
temporarily, and for the limited purpose of safeguarding potential evidence of a crime until a search
warrant could be obtained.”); see also R. v. Butters, [2014] O.J. No. 2159, 309 C.R.R. (2d) 299, at
para. 36 (Ont. C.J.) (“If the police can ameliorate the risks of further criminality … by taking
physical control over a computer tower without putting the material privacy interest at risk by
delaying inspection until a warrant is obtained, the law should and in my view does accommodate
it.”); R. v. Seguin, [2015] O.J. No. 1424, 2015 ONSC 1908, at para. 35 (Ont. S.C.J.) (noting that
“[t]here is a distinction to be drawn between seizing a computer for the purpose of searching it and
actually searching it”).
80
Fearon, supra, note 1, at paras. 139-140, per Karakatsanis J., dissenting; see also Riley,
supra, note 66, at 2484-85.
81
R. v. Kelsy, [2011] O.J. No. 4159, 283 O.A.C. 201, at para. 24 (Ont. C.A.).
82
Criminal Code, supra, note 11, s. 487.11.
83
Liew, supra, note 71, at para. 124 (“The seizure of the phone goes a long way towards
achieving the objective of ensuring that evidence against the accused is secured.”)
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discovered in this case … generally would not disappear if police wait to
acquire a warrant.”84
The Crown raised the concern that if the phone were not searched
immediately, then the suspect’s confederates could remotely delete the
data on that device. Even assuming a highly sophisticated group of
criminals, this problem is not without a relatively easy solution. The
police could simply remove the cell phone’s battery thus disconnecting it
from any remote or cellular networks, or they could place the phone in a
“Faraday bag”, an inexpensive aluminum bag that blocks wireless
communications.85 Given the incredibly high privacy interests at stake in
a cell phone (potentially millions of e-mails, texts and personal
photographs) and the attenuated law enforcement interest (nothing they
can get at the scene cannot be retrieved after a warrant is obtained) the
balance struck in Fearon appears off-kilter.
(b) Morelli/Vu: The Unfinished Business of Setting Limits on Searches of
Digital Devices
While the Morelli/Vu line of cases appears to offer more to individual
privacy than Fearon, its impact is potentially modest. The lesson for law
enforcement from Morelli, Cole, TELUS, Vu and Spencer is clear: If you
want to search someone’s computer or other digital device, get a warrant
and get the proper warrant. But if this is the only lesson, then these cases
will have been a Pyrrhic victory for digital privacy.
Vu demands that the warrant specifically authorize the search of
digital devices. Obtaining such a warrant, however, is not a tough task
for law enforcement. Going forward, the police must establish in the
Information to Obtain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
any computers they discover will contain the evidence for which they are
looking.86 This is not a high hurdle. Most people alive today own
multiple computer devices and use them constantly. Given the
ubiquitousness of computer use, there is a good chance that, if a crime
has been committed, there will be some evidence on a computer. Unless
we develop additional rules constraining the manner of a computer
search, there is a danger that Vu will simply become a lesson to police to

84
85
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Fearon, supra, note 1, at para. 146, per Karakatsanis J. dissenting.
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(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

DIGITAL AGE

459

include computer-related terms in their ITO boilerplate. The question
thus becomes: Once the police have grounds to obtain a computer
warrant, what sensible limitations should be applied to limit the manner
of search?
This question has traditionally been a key concern of section 8. Our
section 8 rights are protected primarily by two rules. First, police must
obtain judicial authorization (usually a search warrant) for the search
before they conduct it.87 The warrant requirement ensures that before a
search is conducted, an impartial judicial officer (i.e., the issuing justice)
turns her mind to the state’s interest in conducting the search and the
individual’s privacy interest in being left alone. Second, even where a
warrant has been issued, the search must be conducted in a reasonable
manner.88 This second prophylactic rule ensures that the search is no
more intrusive than is reasonably necessary to achieve law enforcement’s
objectives.
The Morelli/Vu line of cases deal with section 8’s prior authorization
requirement. They do not speak directly to section 8’s reasonable
manner requirement. And it is the reasonable manner requirement that is
especially vexing when it comes to computers and digital information.89
This problem flows from a computer’s unique features. First, the
search and seizure process is inverted when it comes to digital devices.
In the physical world, one is entitled to a high reasonable expectation of
privacy in one’s home, for example. As such, the search of one’s home is
seen as particularly invasive.90 Search warrants grant police permission
to search a dwelling usually for only limited periods of time (often only
one day). Items are then seized. The search-and-seizure process with
respect to computers is inverted. After seizing the computer during the
initial search, the police may take months (or even years) to conduct a
full forensic search of the device. This inversion means that the time
limits which would apply in the classic search-and-then-seizure sequence
are meaningless. Related to the inversion of the search/seizure process is
87

Hunter v. Southam Inc., supra, note 59, at 160.
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.).
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See Gerald Chan, “Life after Vu: Manner of Computer Searches and Search Protocols” in
J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2013 (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433
(for extended commentary on manner-of-search issues) [hereinafter “Chan”].
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R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) (individuals
are entitled to a high expectation of privacy in the home because it is “the place where our most
intimate and private activities are most likely to take place”).
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the problem of overseizure. Because the computer is seized first and
searched later, the police are necessarily seizing the haystack to search
for the needle.
If we are to take seriously Morelli’s holding that there are few
searches more intrusive than the computer search, then these lengthy
computer searches are the privacy equivalent of having one’s home open
to the police for months on end — for them to come and go as they
please as new case leads develop — without any need to go back before
a judicial officer to get a new warrant.
Second, as noted above, a computer is rarely a stand-alone, selfcontained entity. Thus, even where there are reasonable grounds to
believe that a computer contains documents evidencing crime, there is a
strong likelihood that this evidence is intermingled with private
information on other computers that the government has no reasonable
grounds to search or seize.91
The problem of intermingling is particularly acute in the digital
world. In the physical world, the physical location specified in the
warrant necessarily narrows the ambit of the search. If the warrant gives
the police the authority to search “1000 Elm Street”, then there is little
danger that the police, acting in good faith, will stray into the neighbours’
houses.
Not so with computers. The digital world is different, particularly in
settings where data is shared between multiple users or where data is
stored on common hardware because the boundaries between one
computer and the next are amorphous. For example, the police may have
reasonable grounds to believe that a suspect has accessed child
pornography from the computer in his living room. But what if that
computer is a shared computer, used by the suspect’s spouse and two
adolescent children? Each of these individuals has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in data stored on the computer. The police have no
business seizing or searching data belonging to those third parties, but
their data is intermingled with data for which they do have grounds to
seize. Let us further assume that the spouse is a physician who
sometimes uses the home computer to correspond with patients. Each of
those patients also has a privacy interest in that correspondence stored on
91
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the computer, raising the specter of potentially limitless innocent
third party privacy interests commingled with the data that the police
have grounds to seize.92
The challenges may be even more complex in the workplace. The
typical workplace computer does not exist in a silo. In many companies
and institutions, multiple computers are connected to each other across
cities, countries and continents via company network servers. It is not
unusual for thousands of users to store their work product on a common
or shared server. Each one of those users potentially has privacy interests
in data stored on that network. And if the information stored on the
computer includes private (or privileged) client information, then each
one of those clients may have an expectation of privacy in data stored on
the company network.
The problem of intermingling will only be exacerbated as users
continue to shift data storage from devices to the “cloud”. Cloud
computing refers to the capacity of Internet-connected devices to display
and edit data stored on remote servers.93 Often users may not even know
whether particular information is stored on the device or in the cloud.
But where data is stored in the cloud, it will be intermingled with the
data of potentially millions of other users — all of whom have unique
privacy interests.
Further, doctrines that limit the invasiveness of physical searches do
not map easily — or at all — onto computer searches. The ambit of a
physical-world search warrant is limited by the realities of the physical
world, which prevent the typical search from becoming limitless, dragnet
searches. In United States Fourth Amendment parlance, this is sometimes
known as the “elephant-in-a-matchbox” doctrine (i.e., if the warrant
authorizes police to search only for an elephant, then they have no
business looking in a matchbox).94 Likewise, the plain-view doctrine,
which authorizes the seizure of unanticipated evidence inadvertently
discovered where the officer is lawfully in the premises,95 is

92
See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc., 621 F3d 1162 at 1176-77 (9th
Cir. 2010) (en banc), modifying 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) [hereinafter “Comprehensive
Drug Testing Inc.”].
93
Riley, supra, note 66, at 2491.
94
See Vu (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 22, at para. 47; see also Jackson v. Florida, 18 So. 3d
1016, at 1028, 1029 (Fla. Sup. Ct., 2009), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 1144 (2010).
95
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 37 (S.C.C.).
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circumscribed in the physical world. To qualify for plain view treatment,
the items seized must be found within the area being searched and they
must be conspicuous.96
These concepts do not translate into the digital world. What is in
plain view on the computer or cell phone? This question has been the
subject of much academic discussion, but yields no easy answer.97 In the
digital world, the plain view exception has the potential to swallow up a
virtually limitless space. As long as the investigator is making a good
faith effort to search only for evidence specified in the warrant, then
anything discovered on the computer is potentially captured under the
plain view doctrine. Law enforcement will also argue vigorously that
once given permission to access a computer, they must be able to search
every file and folder — at least in cursory fashion — because the suspect
may be adept at hiding or concealing files in difficult-to-find places. This
gives breadth to the plain view exception that is unfathomable in the
physical world context.
3. The Way Forward: Rigorous Manner-of-Search Review
In light of these challenges, manner-of-search review is the next
frontier in digital-search-and-seizure litigation. Vu and Fearon each raise
distinct challenges to privacy, but the solution to both is to insist on
rigorous manner-of-search review.
In the search warrant context, judges and justices of the peace should
insist that police seeking a computer search warrant propose “search
protocols” as a means to restrict the invasiveness of a computer search.
These protocols will help constrain and limit the invasiveness of a
computer search, and will foster meaningful after-the-fact review.
In the search-incident-to-arrest context in Fearon, there is no
opportunity to impose judicially-sanctioned, ex ante search restrictions
because the Fearon exception is, by definition, warrantless. This makes
after-the-fact review especially important (which the majority
acknowledged in Fearon).98 Rigorous after-the-fact review is essential
to ensure that cell phone searches incident to arrest do not become
96
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fishing expeditions. And to enable that rigorous review, police will
need to make complete and accurate records of their cell phone search,
which will require that they video-record or otherwise digitally log
their searches.
(a) Ex Ante Rules and Search Protocols (Where a Warrant Is
Required)99
“Search protocols” refer to ex ante rules, proposed by the police and
approved by the issuing justice, that specify how the police will conduct
a computer search. The point of a search protocol is to ensure that the
search is “conducted in a reasonable manner”, as section 8 of the Charter
requires.
Search protocols can involve myriad possibilities. They can define,
and thereby constrain, the search for specified keywords, file types and
date ranges; they can limit the search to text files or graphics files; and
they can focus on certain software programs.100 They can also prescribe
the use of more sophisticated search tools based on constantly evolving
forensic technologies that allow law enforcement to conduct computer
searches without opening files by searching based on “file headers”101 or
“hash values”.102 Some of those programs, such as Guidance Software’s
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I have written about the importance of search protocols in an earlier article. See Nader
Hasan, “R. v. Vu: The Right to Digital Privacy and the Need for Search Protocols” (2014) 35:1 For
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100
3817, supra, note 91, at 959.
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Caselaw to Support the Computer Search Guidance in United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing” (2012) 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 741, at 750 [hereinafter “Schuck”].
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“EnCase Forensic Toolkit”, are already used by law enforcement
throughout Canada and other jurisdictions.103
Vu should not be read as closing the door on search protocols. In Vu,
the Court declined to mandate search protocols as a matter of
constitutional imperative, but made it clear that it was not “foreclos[ing]
the possibility that our developing understanding of computer searches
and changes in technology may make it appropriate to impose search
protocols in a broader range of cases in the future”.104 The Court noted
that as the case law develops, “after-the-fact review may lead courts to
set out specific rules according to which searches must be conducted”,
which can then be imported into search protocols.105 In particular, the
Court wrote that issuing justices may find it “necessary and practical” to
impose search protocols in cases involving “confidential intellectual
property or potentially privileged information”.106 In those cases, protocols
could be imposed when police first request authorization to search the
computer. Alternatively, issuing justices may prefer a “two-stage approach”
where they would first issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of the
computer and then have police return for an additional authorization to
search the seized device, which would include a protocol that would limit
the scope of the search.107
(i) Search Protocols Help Address the Unique Problems Posed by
Computers’ Unique Features
As discussed above, the unique features of computers — the highly
personal nature of computer data, the vastness of their storage capacity
and their interconnectedness — make properly limited computer searches
more challenging. Only carefully tailored search protocols can address
the unique manner-of-search issues posed by computers and digital
technologies.
Where police are going into a situation where there is likely to be
intermingling of data — i.e., if the computer is found in a multi-person
dwelling unit or is the server of a large company — the police should be

103
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able to articulate in the ITO what innocent third party privacy interests
exist, and what measures they will take to minimize the intrusion. The
issuing justice should, in turn, scrutinize those measures and issue a
warrant that adequately protects those third-party interests as well as the
suspect’s residual privacy interests. Police should bear the onus of
proving what search protocols will permit them to strike the appropriate
balance between privacy and the needs of law enforcement because they
“have available to them the necessary software, technology and expertise
to enable them to tailor their searches in a fashion that will generate the
information they seek, if it exists, while at the same time minimizing the
intrusion on the computer user’s privacy rights in other information
stored on the computer”.108
While search protocols entail infinite possibilities and will be highly
case-specific, they may include:109
 Where the search involves a shared network or shared hard-drive, the
protocols should specify that the police may not search any part of
hard-drive or server that the suspect did not access.
 If the search involves a shared network or shared hard-drive, the
protocols should specify that the police should not examine files
created prior to when the suspect first gained access to those shared
devices.
 Date-range and keyword search restrictions will be appropriate in
many cases.110
 Where applicable, the protocols should specify that police must work
with third parties to ensure that safeguards are put in place to protect
privileged, private and commercially sensitive information.111
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 In certain investigations, specific file types ought to be excluded
from the search because of the unlikelihood that incriminatory
information will be found in such files. For example, investment
advisers engaged in inside trading are unlikely to snap “selfies” of
their unlawful trades, so there is a strong case for excluding image
and video files from the search in such a case.
 Police currently have access to certain forensic software programs
that have the potential to limit the invasiveness of the computer
search.112 As noted above, forensic software currently available to
police allows analysts to conduct searches based on “file headers” or
“hash values”. The police can then, for example, compare hash
values found in the computer files against databases of hash values
known to be child pornography.113 In many cases, it will be
reasonable to insist that the police perform hash-value or file-header
search before embarking on a more intrusive file-by-file review of
the entire computer.
 Where police intend to use particular forensic programs to search the
computer, those programs should be listed in the search protocols.
 The protocols should specify an end date of the search. If the police
want to extend the search beyond the end date, then they ought to go
back before the issuing justice and persuade her why they need
ongoing access to someone’s computer.
(ii) Search Protocols Foster Reviewability
Section 8 is concerned with preventing unreasonable searches from
occurring — not merely with punishing unreasonable searches after the
fact.114 An advantage of search protocols is that there will be fewer
unreasonable searches because the police will know the rules of the game
before they conduct the search.
And when the defence does challenge the reasonableness of the
search, the search protocols will provide judges with an objective
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baseline against which to assess the reasonableness of the police search.
If the police failed to adhere to the search protocols, then the search is
prima facie unreasonable. If the police did adhere to the search protocols,
then defence counsel would have to show why these protocols were
unreasonable.
Without that objective baseline, the section 8 voir dire will become a
battle of experts conducted in a vacuum. The police will explain why
they could not have conducted the computer search any other way. The
defence computer expert will testify that there were many ways as to
how the search could have been conducted in a less intrusive way. Search
protocols would give judges an objective baseline against which to assess
these arguments.
(iii) Search Protocols Will Ensure the Integrity of Evidence
Search protocols can also help law enforcement ensure the integrity
of evidence by requiring that computer searches to be done in controlled
laboratory settings by technically trained officers. Computers are
sophisticated devices. Improper handling — or even manual computer
searches done outside of the laboratory setting — can damage or destroy
evidence.115 Simply opening a file or turning on a computer can
overwrite data, and may alter the “meta-data”, which show when the
suspect created or last accessed a file.116
The manual search of a computer is the equivalent of walking into a
murder scene with muddy boots and removing bare-handed a knife from
the victim and dropping it in one’s coat pocket. Search protocols can help
law enforcement address these risks. In both Vu and in Fearon, for
example, the officers performed a manual search on the suspect’s digital
devices.117 If the time that the device was accessed had been at issue in
those cases, the officer likely would have compromised that evidence
simply by accessing the device.
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(b) Ex Post Review and the Importance of Record-Keeping
(Warrantless Context)
The Charter’s default position is that the State needs a warrant to
search a place or thing,118 including — or rather, especially — digital
devices. The carve-out in Fearon is exceptional. But to ensure that the
Fearon exception does not swallow the general rule, courts must insist
on rigorous ex post manner-of-search review of searches and seizures of
digital devices.
The majority in Fearon was alive to this concern, noting that
“[a]fter-the-fact judicial review is especially important where, as in the
case of searches incident to arrest, there is no prior authorization.”119
Going forward, the courts will have to devise ways to ensure meaningful
after-the-fact review of warrantless cell phone searches. This challenge is
unique from the warranted context, where the manner of search can be
constrained ex ante by search protocols attached to the warrant.
Meaningful after-the-fact reasonableness review involves
scrutinizing the police conduct to determine whether the police search
was more far-reaching than necessary, with regard to the objectives of
the search; the nature of the offence for which the police have reasonable
grounds to believe has been committed; the grounds for believing that
the device will afford evidence of the offence; and the means at law
enforcement’s disposal to narrow the parameters of the search.
As outlined above, the imposition of search protocols constraining
the warranted search will foster meaningful review and it will help
prevent overbroad searches before they happen. But Vu makes it clear
that regardless of whether the issuing justice imposes ex ante restrictions,
the police do not have the licence to rummage indiscriminately through
all of the data on the device:
By now it should be clear that my finding that a search protocol was
not constitutionally required in this case does not mean that once police
had the warrant in hand, they had a licence to scour the devices
indiscriminately. They were bound, in their search, to adhere to the rule
that the manner of the search must be reasonable. Thus, if, in the course
of their search, the officers realized that there was in fact no reason to

118
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search a particular program or file on the device, the law of search and
seizure would require them not to do so.120

Trial-level decisions have taken up this concept and the principles
they have developed can be applied to the Fearon context and help foster
meaningful review. First, in R. v. Sop, the accused was charged with two
offences relating to child pornography.121 The police had obtained a
warrant to seize and search the suspect’s electronic devices. There were
no search protocols attached to the warrant.122 The police went on to
scour 40 terabytes of data on multiple computers (which the court found
was equivalent to an amount of paper that would “fill 14,000 pickup
trucks”).123 The accused argued that the search was overbroad; the trial
judge agreed and held that this approach violated the accused’s section 8
rights. Although the warrant did not specify any search restrictions, the
police were still bound by the reasonable manner requirement of section 8
of the Charter. The police knew the file names and hash values of the
child pornography files for which they were looking. But rather than
begin the search using a targeted keyword search or a hash value search,
the police manually combed through all of the data.124 They did so
despite having the technological tools available to perform targeted
searches. The Court wrote:
There is no evidence before me that the police first tried to search by
name, date or hash values. Depending on what the police found after
these searches, they may have to apply different search techniques or
apply for a new search warrant.
Rather than try this approach the police combed through 40 TB of data
which contained in addition to the alleged child pornography, adult
pornography, lifestyle choices, sexual orientation, business travel,
personal affairs and business affairs all of which would have been
extremely private and sensitive information to the Applicant.
.....
Still from a search procedure point of view, one would have thought the
police would have used the parameters they knew to try to narrow their
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search and if they were unsuccessful they would have likely been
justified doing a more invasive search. From the number of hours the
police spent doing this search, it is almost unbelievable they wouldn't
have tried to use the specific information they had to their advantage.
If the police had been unable to locate the movies and photographs they
knew about by doing different parameter searches they would have
been authorized to continue looking by other methods … without
further authorization. However, it appears to this court that the police
simply wanted to do a general search of all 40 TB of storage space.
Perhaps because of the amount of storage space they seized they
thought they may have stumbled onto something much larger than the
11 videos and 380 pictures that they knew had been downloaded.125

The Court went on to exclude the unlawfully obtained evidence
under section 24(2) of the Charter because the decision to “search every
and each file in the accused’s vast computer system when they had very
specific information about what they were looking for” was
“unwarranted and somewhat egregious”.126
In R. v. Nurse, two co-accused were charged with murder.127 The
Crown’s theory was that Nurse hired the co-accused Plummer to carry
out the killing. The police had grounds to believe that the two co-accused
communicated with each other about their plot using their Blackberry
devices. The OPP sent the devices to the RCMP to conduct a full “data
dump” and analysis of every file on the devices. The Court held that this
manner of search was unduly overbroad and a violation of section 8 of
the Charter. The officers “should have realized that there was no reason
to search all programs and files on the devices”.128 Because the relevant
evidence consisted of recent communications between Nurse and
Plummer, the search should have been limited to “BBM chats, SMS
(texts), emails, notes, and call logs”.129 Searching the web browsing
history, photographs and Internet cookies was unreasonable under the
circumstances.
Meaningful ex post manner-of-search review was possible in Sop
and Nurse because there was a record detailing the extent of the search.
The need for a comprehensive record of the search was top-of-mind for
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the Fearon majority. Justice Cromwell suggested that one way to ensure
meaningful review in the warrantless context is to require that officers
“make detailed notes of what they have examined on the cell phone”.130
Indeed, the majority writes that a requirement of detailed note-taking
“should be imposed as a matter of constitutional imperative” because the
Fearon exception involves an “extraordinary search power that requires
neither a warrant nor reasonable and probable grounds”.131
The majority includes only a single sentence explaining what
“detailed notes” means in this context. These notes should “generally”
include: (1) applications searched, (2) the extent of the search, (3) the
time of the search and (4) its purpose and duration.132
It will be necessary for the lower courts to flesh out these
requirements. A bare requirement that officers “take detailed notes”
pertaining to these four broad categories will not foster meaningful
review.133 As any criminal lawyer can attest, a given officer’s idea of
“detailed notes” will vary with the length of the police officer’s foot.
Meaningful after-the-fact review in the warrantless search context
requires more than “detailed notes”. It requires meticulously accurate and
thoroughly complete records. Given the privacy interests at stake — and
the attendant risks that the police’s searches could easily drift into fishing
expeditions — the police should be able to account for every button they
press and every keystroke they make on the digital device. Anything
short of such a complete and accurate record will frustrate meaningful
after-the-fact review.
It would, of course, be cumbersome for police officers to manually
record in their notebooks every keystroke they make while conducting the
search. Many of these warrantless searches will take place on-scene —
either roadside, as in Mr. Fearon’s case, or in some other inconvenient
circumstance. Accordingly, unless and until the technology becomes
available to create a digital log of the officer’s roadside search, courts ought
to insist that officers make a video record of the search.
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Electronic video recording will create a complete and accurate record
and foster meaningful after-the-fact review. Knowing that defence
counsel will have a video recording of their search will help to ensure
that officers take seriously the requirement that warrantless searches be
narrowly tailored and truly incidental to the arrest. It would have the
desired effect of “helping police officers focus on the question of
whether their conduct in relation to the phone falls squarely within the
parameters of a lawful search incident to arrest”.134 The video recording
requirement is also much less cumbersome and less time-consuming than
requiring officers to capture the same information in their notes.
The video recording of evidence is not a novel concept. In many
jurisdictions, videography is routinely used to record crime scenes. It is
also increasingly common for police to video record the execution of a
search of a dwelling conducted pursuant to a warrant.135 It is also now
routine for the police to electronically record interviews of suspects and
witnesses.136 And increasingly, citizens and groups are calling for police
officers’ entire interactions with members of the public to be video
recorded (despite the impact on privacy).137 The Innocence Project
identifies the video recording of interrogations as a key safeguard against
false confessions.138 Video recording reduces the incidence of police
misconduct. If interrogators know that their acts are being monitored, it
is less likely that they will employ tactics that overstep their lawful
authority. It will also make instances of misconduct easier to identify.
In those situations, having an unassailable record of what happened —
including the precise sequence of events — is invaluable. These same
rationales for video recording evidence in the above-mentioned contexts
apply with equal vigour to video recording of cell phone searches. Rifling
through a suspect’s cell phone is a tempting proposition because it is
so easy to do and because there are no witnesses. It is less tempting if
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the officer knows that the search is being recorded. The knowledge that
each keystroke is being electronically recorded will force the officer to
carefully turn his mind to the legitimate goals of the search incident
to arrest.
A video record will help establish that the officer’s search remained
moored to its purpose and did not stray into a fishing expedition. If the
officer legitimately feared that the suspect had summoned his
confederates for assistance (a scenario the Fearon majority
contemplated), then reviewing the most recent text messages or e-mails
or numbers dialed on the call log is arguably a reasonable search.
Rummaging through older e-mails or reviewing the Internet browser
history is not tailored to the purpose of ensuring officer safety.
Still photography and screen shots of the cell phone search can be
selective, but a video is an all-encompassing record of the search.
Videography would capture not only the entire scope of the search, but
also its sequence. Sequencing matters when it comes to assessing the
reasonableness of the manner of search. There may be instances where it
is permissible to look in less obvious places. A suspect is not necessarily
going to store his incriminating documents in the “incriminating
documents” folder. But one would expect that an officer, acting
reasonably, would begin with the obvious places first and then move to
the less obvious ones.139 An officer looking for a photograph of a gun
should not begin with the Internet browser history. A video record would
provide an objective baseline against which one could evaluate the
reasonableness of the officer’s sequence of search.
If a complete and accurate record of the search is preserved, then
counsel will have the proper evidentiary foundation to challenge the
manner of search. If the officer cannot articulate why they took a given
step in conducting the warrantless search, then the search may be
unreasonable and a violation of section 8. On the other hand, officers
behaving properly will have video evidence to corroborate their
testimony.

The United States case law suggests that the police must follow the “obvious to obscure”
approach when conducting computer searches as a way to ensure that searches do not become
fishing expeditions. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, at 1094 (10th Cir. 2009)
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II. CONCLUSION
The first five years of the Supreme Court of Canada’s digital-searchand-seizure jurisprudence has been a mixed bag for privacy. The Court’s
awareness of how computer and cell phone technologies affect privacy,
and that these new realities should inform the scope of section 8 Charter
rights is a welcome development. But these decisions deal primarily with
only one aspect of section 8 — the warrant requirement. They do not
fully address an equally important prophylactic rule of section 8 — that
even lawful searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner.
To strike the proper balance between law enforcement needs and
privacy, searches conducted pursuant to a warrant must be appropriately
constrained. It will be important to develop rules that constrain the
manner of a computer search conducted pursuant to a computer search
warrant. Going forward, courts ought to (and counsel ought to urge
courts to) include “search protocols” in computer search warrants that
will impose limits on how, where, when and for how long the police can
search our electronic devices.
The Court’s recent decision in Fearon poses a different but related
set of challenges. Fearon permits a warrantless search of one’s computer
device under the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Although the search
power pursuant to this exception is limited, the potential for abuse is
vast. The task of trial courts and of counsel is to ensure rigorous ex post
review of warrantless cell phone searches. This will require precise
record-keeping. Mere note-taking may not be enough. Courts ought to
insist on the digital recording — either by way of video or other digital
device — to ensure the best record of the search incident to arrest. Only
such meticulous record-keeping will ensure meaningful ex post review of
warrantless cell phone searches.

